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Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community 
in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and 
terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably 
overrepresented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this 
topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts’ 
involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. 
Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality 
of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert 
overrepresentation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of 
foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts’ involvement in 
homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that 
overrepresentation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that 
it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for 
converts’ involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been 
provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly 
personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically 
sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts 
become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes 
by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet 
under-researched topic. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western 
countries.1 Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism2 and terrorism3 , research has 
suggested that converts are considerably overrepresented.4 By summarising some of 
the most notable existing studies, this ICCT Policy Brief clarifies what is known about 
converts’ involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Its 
goal is to serve as an introduction to this topic. Two questions guide the discussion. 
First, does the available data corroborate the idea that converts to Islam are 
overrepresented in Islamist extremism and militancy? Second, what explanations have 
been put forward for how and why some converts to Islam adopt extremist views and, 
in some cases, become involved in terrorist violence? 
 
A small number of researchers have looked specifically at converts’ role in Islamist 
extremism and terrorism.5 Yet a clear understanding of the issue has yet to emerge. As 
Van San argues, “empirical research on the involvement of converts in Islamism-related 
offences shows a fragmented picture”.6 By bringing together current insights into this 
subject, the present paper hopes to provide a nuanced point of entry into an important 
and as of yet under-researched topic. The qualification “nuanced” needs to be 
emphasised, as it is the authors’ intention to avoid the stigmatisation of all converts to 
Islam. A convert is defined here as a person with a religious but non-Islamic or a non-
religious background who adopts a Muslim identity.7 The majority of those who adopt 
this religion never become radicalised or involved in terrorism. Converting to Islam 
should by itself not be seen as raising a security concern. Indeed, conversion much 
more frequently has positive influences, such as increased self-esteem, that are too 
frequently left out of the discussion.8 The question is what factors set some converts 
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apart, bringing them to adopt extremist interpretations of their newfound faith or even 
leading to involvement in terrorism. 
 
2. Outline & Methodology 
 
After briefly outlining the research methodology, the discussion turns to the question 
of numbers. What data is available on converts and their involvement in Islamist 
extremism or terrorism? How many foreign fighters are converts to Islam? 
Subsequently, the focus shifts to the explanations that have been put forward to 
account for convert radicalisation and/or their involvement in militancy. The Policy Brief 
concludes with a call for a more comprehensive research agenda focused on better 
understanding the varied factors that can bring some converts to Islam to adopt radical 
views or become involved in Islamist terrorism. 
 
This paper is based on a literature review that incorporated two steps of data collection. 
First, Internet search engines and relevant databases of academic research were used 
to survey the literature. Secondly, the references given in these publications were 
utilised to find further literature via the “snowballing” approach.9 Because this Policy 
Brief is intended as a brief introduction to the topic of convert radicalisation, the 
literature review was limited in scope to those publications that dealt mainly or 
exclusively with converts’ involvement in homegrown jihadism or foreign fighting. In 
other words, the focus is on those converts who actually become involved in militancy 
and terrorism rather than on those who ‘merely’ adopted fundamentalist or radical 
views. 
 
Even with this demarcation in place, the review uncovered numerous publications - 
some written by academics, others by journalists or researchers at think tanks – that 
deal with or reference converts’ involvement in Islamist extremism or terrorism.10 Most 
of these do not, or largely in anecdotal fashion, provide empirical data on converts’ 
involvement in extremism and terrorism. Peer-reviewed academic studies that focus 
exclusively on convert radicalisation are currently few in number.11 Most of these works 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
take the form of case-studies. The numbers of converts analysed per study ranges from 
a handful to several dozen. Empirical insights into the life stories and motivations of 
(would-be) convert foreign fighters are fewer still.12 The relative scarcity of empirically-
supported research on convert radicalisation emphasises that much of the currently 
available information on this phenomenon should be treated as speculative. 
 
3. Convert Radicalisation – What Do We 
Know 
 
Since most Western states do not register their citizens’ religious affiliation, reliable 
information regarding the size of the Muslim community and the total number of 
converts within them is scarce, fragmented and frequently out of date. Where possible, 
the authors relied on data produced by the reputable Pew Research Center. But 
especially when it comes to estimates for the number of converts, the quality and 
sometimes impartiality of the source material could frequently not be ascertained. The 
authors stress that Table 1 provides a rough estimate of the number of converts in 
several Western countries. 
 
The percentages in Table 1 were calculated by matching, per country, the lowest and 
highest estimates for the number of converts to the lowest and highest estimates for 
the total Muslim population respectively. In most cases this yielded a percentage range. 
This should be taken as an estimate for the percentage of converts in the time period 
covered, not as an indication for the growth or decline of that population during the 
years given. The limitations of the currently available data are further underlined by 
outliers such as the United States, which boasts 23% converts among its Muslim 
population whereas other Western states in Table 1 do not reach a figure higher than 
5.1%. Again it is emphasised that these figures are solely intended to provide an 
indication of the percentage of converts in Western countries. 
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Country Estimated Number 
of Converts to 
Islam 
Estimated 
Number of 
Muslims 
Estimated % 
Converts in Muslim 
Population 
Belgium 2007: 10,00013 
2015: 56,00014 
2007: 500,00015 
2010: 630,00016 
2.0 – 8.8% 
Canada Unknown 2004: 579,64017 Unknown 
Denmark 2010: 2,80018 2010: 200,00019  1.4% 
France 2009: 50,000 – 
100,00020 
2015: >215,00021 
2009: 3,554,00022 
2010: 4,710,00023 
1.4- 4.6% 
 
Germany 2004: 12,000 – 
100,00024 
2015: >215,00025 
2009: 402600026 
2010: 4,760,00027 
 
0.3 – 4.5% 
Spain 2006: 20,00028 
2015: 50,00029 
2006: 800,00030 
2010: 980,00031 
2.5 – 5.1% 
The 
Netherlands 
2006: 12,00032 
2015: 17,00033 
2006: 850,00034  
2010: 1,000,00035 
1.4 – 1.7% 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
United 
Kingdom 
2001: 63,00036 
2010: 100,00037 
2001: 1,600,00038  
2010: 2,869,00039  
3.5 – 3.9% 
United States 2007: 552,00040 2007: 2,400,00041 23.0% 
Sweden 2006: 6,00042 2006: 300,000 – 
350,00043 
1.7 – 2.0% 
Table 1: Number of converts to Islam in several Western countries 
 
Although the figures in Table 1 should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism, 
they do underline one important conclusion. Converts form a (small) minority within 
the Islamic communities of the Western countries covered. This is important in order 
to establish whether converts truly are as overrepresented in Islamist extremism and 
terrorism as is often reported. 
 
3.1 Converts in Homegrown Jihadist Plots 
 
The study of convert radicalisation focuses mainly on the involvement of converts in 
so-called “homegrown” jihadism.44 But just as the data collected in Table 1 needed to 
be treated with scepticism, so does the available information on converts’ involvement 
in this form of political violence. As Mullins argued as recently as 2015 regarding this 
issue, “there has been relatively little in the way of systematic research”. 45  Little is 
known about the number of converts involved in homegrown jihadism in Western 
countries. Using anecdotal and largely unverifiable information, however, does lead to 
some interesting preliminary findings. Table 2 suggests that converts are indeed 
overrepresented in homegrown jihadist plots in Spain and the United Kingdom, but it 
presents a more nuanced set of findings with regard to the United States. Whereas 
converts appear to be overrepresented in homegrown jihadist plots in 2015, their 
involvement in such activities prior to roughly 2013 does not support a similar 
conclusion.46 
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Country 
 
Estimated % 
Converts in Muslim 
Population 
Number of 
Homegrown 
Jihadists 
% Converts among 
Homegrown 
Jihadists 
Belgium 2.0 – 8.8% Unknown Unknown 
Canada Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Denmark 1.4% Unknown Unknown 
France 1.4 – 4.6% Unknown Unknown 
Germany 0.3 – 4.5% Unknown Unknown 
Spain 2.5 – 5.1% Unknown 14.0%47 
The 
Netherlands 
1.4 – 1.7% Unknown Unknown 
United 
Kingdom 
3.5 – 3.9% 2001 – 2013: 28848 
1980 – 2001: 13949 
2001-2013: 12%50 
1980-2001: 9%51 
United States 23.0% 2015: 5652 
2001 – 2013: 22353 
1980 – 2001: 14354 
2015: 40.0%55 
2001 – 2013: 23.0%56 
1980 – 2001: 17.0%57 
Sweden 1.7 – 2.0% Unknown Unknown 
Table 2: Converts’ involvement in homegrown jihadism 
 
3.2 Converts among Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq 
 
Foreign (terrorist) fighters – seen here as individuals who have left (Western) countries 
to join jihadist terrorist groups overseas – have drawn considerable attention from 
policy makers and academics over the past several years. Perhaps owing to this fact, 
there appears to be slightly more data available on the number of converts among this 
particular segment of the militant Islamist population. For instance, a recent report by 
the ICCT, which looked at foreign (terrorist) fighters from several European countries, 
concluded that 6 – 23% of those who had travelled to Syria and Iraq were converts to 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Islam. 58  Using the available data, Table 3 breaks this number down to show the 
estimated number of converts among foreign fighters for several Western countries. 
Again, the available information tentatively supports the notion that converts are 
overrepresented in Islamist extremism and terrorism. 
 
Country Estimated % Converts in 
Muslim Population 
Estimated 
Number of 
Foreign 
Fighters59 
% Converts among 
FF in Syria / Iraq 
Belgium 2.0 – 8.8% 420 – 516 6% 
Canada Unknown 10060 Unknown 
Denmark 1.4% 125 Unknown 
France 1.4 – 4.6% >900 23.0% 
Germany 0.3 – 4.5% 720 – 760 12.0 – 16.0%61 
Spain 2.5 – 5.1% 120 – 139 Unknown 
The 
Netherlands 
1.4 – 1.7% 200 – 250 11.8 – 18.4%62 
United 
Kingdom 
3.5 – 3.9% 700 – 760 Unknown 
United 
States 
23.0% Unknown Unknown 
Sweden 1.7 – 2.0% 300 Unknown 
Table 3: Number of converts among foreign fighters 
 
3.3 Overview: Convert Involvement in Homegrown Jihadism 
and Foreign Fighting 
 
Bringing Tables 1 through 3 together yields the following overview. Table 4 first of all 
illustrates that there is little (publicly accessible) “hard” data on the number of converts 
involved in Islamist extremism and terrorism. The second conclusion to draw from 
Table 4 is that, even if these data limitations are taken into account, converts to Islam 
in Western countries do indeed appear to be overrepresented in homegrown jihadist 
plots and participation in overseas conflicts as foreign fighters. As Table 2 showed, such 
overrepresentation was not necessarily the case in all countries at all times; in the 
United States this appears to be a post 2013 development. Yet in general the available 
information supports the overrepresentation hypothesis. 
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Country Estimated % of 
converts in Muslim 
Population 
% Converts 
among FF in 
Syria / Iraq 
% Converts among 
Homegrown 
Jihadists 
Belgium 2.0 – 8.8% 6% Unknown 
Canada Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Denmark 1.4% Unknown Unknown 
France 1.4 – 4.6% 23% Unknown 
Germany 0.3 – 4.5% 12 – 16% Unknown 
Spain 2.5 – 5.1% Unknown 14.0% 
The 
Netherlands 
1.4 – 1.7% 11.8 – 18.4% Unknown 
United 
Kingdom 
3.5 – 3.9% Unknown 2001-2013: 12% 
1980-2001: 9% 
United 
States 
 
23.0% Unknown 2015: 40% 
2001-2013: 23% 
1980 – 2013: 17% 
Sweden 1.7 – 2.0% Unknown Unknown 
Table 4: Overview of converts involved in foreign fighting or homegrown jihadism 
 
4. Explaining Convert Radicalisation 
 
All of the publications utilised for this Policy Brief stress that there is no universal “key 
factor” that leads to the radicalisation of converts. Instead, several authors emphasise 
the importance of individual processes and group-level factors as harbouring the 
mechanisms that can lead converts to involvement in extremism and terrorism. Some 
scholars argue that these factors play a larger role in the radicalisation processes of 
converts than explanations found at the structural level of analysis, such as 
discrimination or reaction to international conflicts.63 This final part of the Policy Brief 
begins by discussing some commonly-encountered explanations for convert 
radicalisation before turning to the more empirically robust studies, which are 
discussed in more detail. While none can yet address the overrepresentation of 
converts to Islam in Islamist militancy and foreign fighting, the studies discussed below 
do offer several useful starting points to begin exploring this phenomenon. 
 
4.1 Commonly-Found Explanations for Convert Radicalisation 
 
Over the past several years, numerous articles have mentioned factors thought to bring 
about converts’ involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism. Because the 
empirical basis for these commonly-encountered hypotheses is frequently unclear, 
their explanatory value cannot always be ascertained. One such hypothesis holds that 
converts are more vulnerable to radicalisation because they lack knowledge of Islam.64 
Others see converts’ proneness to radicalisation as stemming from “converts’ zeal”: the 
desire to show dedication to a newfound faith by embracing it in a particularly fanatical 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
and literal fashion. 65  More generally, several authors make the point that convert 
radicalisation may stem from their problematic backgrounds, such as a history of abuse 
or addiction, family problems, a criminal record or time spent in prison.66  
 
Interesting though these latter findings are, they do not provide a conclusive answer to 
why some converts become involved in radicalism and militancy. It is crucial to note 
that there are many people who share a similar background yet never become involved 
in such activities. Moreover, data collected by the third author has indicated that most 
converts, radicalised or not, are disillusioned to some degree with modern or Western 
life and have displayed some form of anti-social or stigmatised behaviour, such as 
alcohol or drug abuse, before converting. Such background factors therefore do not 
appear to be discriminating variables when it comes to accounting for how and why 
some converts to Islam embrace extremism and militancy. 
 
4.2 Empirical Insights 
 
Based on eight case-studies of Dutch and Belgian Muslims (and recent converts to 
Islam) who have joined the Islamic State that Van San describes in her study, there 
appears to be a considerable degree of truth to at least some of the above 
observations. 67  Most of the converts in her study do indeed have a problematic 
background, have little knowledge of Islam and appear to be easily influenced. 
However, the small sample size means that care must be taken not to generalise these 
findings to all radicalised converts. All the more so since it remains unclear what set 
apart these eight cases from the many other individuals with similar backgrounds who 
do not radicalise. In general, as Kleinmann points out, care should be taken not to 
overemphasise a convert’s life prior to conversion as holding the answers to their 
subsequent radicalisation.68 
 
Bartoszewicz is most clearly opposed to some of the more commonsensical 
explanations for convert radicalisation. She disagrees with the notion of “convert’s 
zeal”, the image of converts as “disaffected and often troubled young people” and the 
suggestion that a lack of “cultural bearings or a sound religious grounding” makes an 
individual more vulnerable to radical interpretations of Islam is dismissed as 
erroneous.69 Bartoszewicz states that “such conceptual errors can lead to a false and 
misleading perception of the causality between European converts to Islam and 
terrorism”.70 These differing points of view illustrate just how difficult it is at this point 
in time to arrive at broadly-shared, empirically supported explanations for converts’ 
involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism. 
 
The following paragraphs further discuss recent empirical research on convert 
radicalisation. This discussion is broken into three parts. The first looks at research that 
studies convert radicalisation from an individual-level perspective. The second 
incorporates studies with a broader analytical focus that includes group and structural-
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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level factors. In the final subsection, research is discussed that looks at the process of 
conversion itself as a potential source of answers for why some converts radicalise. 
 
Explanations focusing on the individual characteristics of converts 
 
Bartoszewicz argues in her 2013 study, which is based in part on 30 interviews, that 
factors at the individual level of analysis are key to understanding convert 
radicalisation. She stresses the importance of identity and belonging: "Individuals 
feeling at ease with their hitherto prevailing identity and who embrace Islam not as the 
essence of “the other" but as something that completes the wholeness of their 
personality (acceptance) are far less inclined to proceed to activities that aim at 
destroying the culture in which they were brought up as opposed to those who, in order 
to embrace Islam, feel the need to discard in an act of rejection all that they were before 
[converting to Islam]."71 On the other hand she argues that, "when someone not so 
much embraces Islam, but rejects the West and everything it represents (…) they make 
themselves more vulnerable towards radicalisation."72  
 
In other words, Bartoszewicz makes the case that a convert’s likeliness for radicalisation 
is related to his or her pre-existing image of self and society. Someone who is at ease 
with their own sense of identity is argued to be less vulnerable to the adoption of radical 
or extremist views after conversion. The same applies with regard to such individuals’ 
views of society; those who embrace Islam out of a negative attitude toward Western 
values and culture are more susceptible to radicalisation than those who experienced 
no such hostility or tension. For Bartoszewicz, the likeliness of convert radicalisation is 
thus closely linked to the personality of said individuals. 
 
In her 2015 study, Van San looks at eight cases of Belgian and Dutch converts who 
joined the Islamic State. She concludes that most female converts in her sample who 
have joined the Islamic State turned to Islam as a result of behavioural issues or 
traumatic events in their youth, such as being abandoned by parents.73 Regarding their 
conversion, Van San states that “it was their way of leaving the past behind and seeking 
forgiveness.”74 However, she also notes the influence of a more mundane factor; some 
female converts travelled to the so-called Islamic State because they fell in love with a 
foreign fighter.75 As for the men in Van San’s sample, “previous disappointment” in life, 
a period of religious seeking and an interest in Islam appeared to be key factors in their 
subsequent radicalisation.76 Valuable as these findings are, they raise a point made 
previously; namely, that many people, converts or otherwise, have similar experiences 
yet never turn to radicalism or violence. Studying convert radicalisation using a control 
group of non-radical converts is essential to better understand what processes or 
characteristics set those who do radicalise apart. 
 
Kleinmann’s 2012 study of 83 Sunni militants in the United States includes 36 converts. 
Looking at the post-9/11 period, Kleinmann finds that “individual or internal forces, 
such as identity issues or cognitive function and style, play a much greater role in 
radicalizing converts than they do for those raised as Muslims”. Similar to Van San and 
in line with Wiktorowicz’ 2005 study on Muslim extremism in the West, Kleinmann 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
points to the importance of “cognitive openings” prior to radicalisation – (traumatic) 
personal experiences that can set into motion an introspective period of “religious 
seeking”. 77 Kleinmann also notes a higher incidence of mental health issues among the 
Sunni militants in his sample than among the general population.78  
 
Interestingly, Kleinmann is careful to emphasise that convert radicalisation is not solely 
attributable to individual-level factors. He stressed that “for both converts and non-
converts, radicalisation is largely the result of recruitment by militant movements or 
radical friends and family. Internal mechanisms alone are not sufficient for 
radicalisation.”79 This underlines that convert radicalisation should not be understood 
as solely the result of individual-level factors and draws attention to scholars who have 
utilised a wider array of analytical perspectives, in particular social movement theory 
and social identity theory, to study this phenomenon. 
 
Explanations utilising multiple analytical perspectives 
 
In his 2015 comparative study, Mullins compares jihadi converts in the United Kingdom 
and the US to non-converts, looking at the situation both before and after 9/11. Mullins 
finds that the post-9/11 subset of American converts more frequently suffered from 
mental health issues than the non-convert population. 80  This interesting finding 
reinforces the emphasis that previous paragraphs have placed on convert’s personal 
characteristics as encompassing explanations for why some of them become involved 
in Islamist militancy. However, Mullins’ study also broadens this analytical focus by 
drawing attention to the role of socio-demographic variables. 
 
Mullins finds that the same subset of converts conformed “perhaps more than any 
other group, to the notion that people are drawn to Islamist terrorism as a result of 
being marginalized in society.”81 The role of relative socioeconomic deprivation as a 
factor that may contribute to convert radicalisation has also been noted by other 
authors.82 Interestingly, Mullins’ research shows converts in the United Kingdom to be 
a less distinct group of individuals. Rather than socioeconomics or mental health 
related issues, Mullins hypothesises that British converts’ involvement in Islamist 
violence “might be due to the fact that they are more likely to come into contact with, 
and/or deliberately targeted for recruitment by extremist networks.” 83  Mullins also 
offers a speculative explanation for the recent increase in convert radicalisation in the 
United States, which he sees as tied to the growing importance of social media as a 
“vehicle for terrorist propaganda and recruitment”.84 In short, Mullins’ research points 
to the importance of a combination of individual, group and structural-level 
(socioeconomic deprivation, social media) factors. 
 
In his study of European jihadi converts, Karagiannis also mentions individual-, group- 
and structural-level processes as contributing to the radicalisation of at least some 
European jihadi converts. Karagiannis finds that some converts in his sample 
radicalised as a result of political grievances related to, for instance, the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict, whereas others were set on the path toward involvement in 
extremism by experiences with discrimination or the influence of friends and partners 
with radical views.85 His findings also emphasise the role that “inspirational preaching” 
can play in the radicalisation process, pointing to the potential influence of authority 
figures with radical or extremist convictions.86 
 
The process of convert radicalisation 
 
The research mentioned in the previous paragraphs looked at converts’ personality and 
background, their social networks and the influence of broader structural or macro-
level factors to understand convert radicalisation. As Bartoszewicz argues, however, 
“conversion to Islam, has an immense impact on the subsequent “being a Muslim”. 
Therefore, in an attempt to investigate converts’ radicalisation, one needs to look at the 
conversion stories.”87 Thus, improving our understanding of convert radicalisation may 
be as much about looking at the individuals themselves as the process that was their 
conversion experience. All the more so since, as Flower and Kleinmann noted in 2013, 
“how the mechanisms of conversion correlate and intersect with radicalisation is not 
yet well understood.”88 
 
Despite this general lack of insights into whether and how the conversion experience 
relates to the likeliness of convert radicalisation, two aspects of this debate need to be 
noted. The first is the absence of evidence for a clear relationship between conversion 
and radicalisation. Although perhaps an obvious point, it deserves to be emphasised 
here as several authors stress its absence.89 For instance, in their 2014 study involving 
25 cases of Canadian converts, Flower and Birkett conclude “that conversion to Islam 
alone is not a valid or reliable predictive indicator of whether a person is likely to 
radicalize.”90 
 
Secondly, it is as of yet unclear whether those converts who radicalise do so 
immediately after (or during, or even before) their conversion to Islam. Research 
findings support different conclusions on this topic. Flower argues that “there is 
generally a lag phase between the time of religious conversion, a rise in religiosity, the 
manifestation of radical Islamist inclinations, extremism and finally terrorism.” 91 
Contrary to these findings, the cases of female Belgian and Dutch converts who joined 
the Islamic State imply that conversion and radicalisation were much more closely 
linked in time. Looking at the women in her sample, Van San concluded that 
“conversion and subsequent departure for Syria were more often of an impulsive 
nature.”92 If nothing else, these contrarian findings do underline just how difficult it is 
to speak of convert radicalisation as a singular process or mechanism.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This Policy Brief set out to provide an introduction to the topic of convert radicalisation 
by addressing two questions: are converts to Islam disproportionally involved in 
Islamist extremism and militancy, and what explanations have been put forward for 
convert radicalisation? Data on the number of converts in Western countries and their 
involvement in homegrown jihadism and foreign fighting is often lacking, out of date 
and marred by numerous serious concerns with regard to reliability and impartiality. 
Nevertheless, the available information does generally support the hypothesis of 
convert overrepresentation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign 
fighters. What little data was found on converts’ involvement in homegrown jihadism 
provided a more nuanced picture, emphasising that overrepresentation may not be the 
norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. 
 
Research on why some converts to Islam become involved in Islamist extremism and 
terrorism stresses the influence of a multitude of factors. Some authors have 
underlined the importance of distinct personal characteristics and backgrounds. These 
include a higher likeliness of mental health issues than is found among the general 
population and a history of problematic or even traumatic life experiences. To some of 
these individuals, involvement in Islamist extremism and even terrorism appears to 
offer a newfound sense of identity and belonging as well as a clear sense of purpose 
that was lacking in their “previous” lives. 
 
Complementing this focus on converts’ personalities and backgrounds, other empirical 
research has drawn attention to group and structural-level explanatory variables. For 
instance, several authors found that radicalised converts were more likely to have 
experienced (relative) socioeconomic deprivation. Others highlighted experiences with 
discrimination and political grievances. At the group-level of analysis, findings pointed 
to the importance of group dynamics, such as pre-existing social ties to radical or 
extremist individuals and the role of extremist authority figures. It should come as little 
surprise that how and why some converts to Islam become involved in radicalism and 
militancy is as complex and multifaceted a topic as understanding participation in 
radicalism and terrorism in general. 93  One of the questions this raises is how the 
experiences of converts are different from non-converts similarly involved in Islamist 
militancy. Perhaps most urgently, the present findings underline the need to compare 
radicalised with non-radicalised converts to see what makes the former stand out. 
 
Finally, the conversion process itself deserves our attention as a potential source of 
answers for why some converts radicalise. Relatively few studies have looked at this 
particular aspect and the currently available findings cannot yet provide a clear answer 
on what factors might make it more likely that the conversion experience leads to the 
adoption of radical or extremist views. Yet it forms an analytical perspective that 
deserves more attention, as it complements current efforts to understand convert 
radicalisation from a personal, social and situational perspective with one that takes a 
process-oriented approach. It would be very useful to conduct further studies on how 
the conversion experience of converts who radicalise differs from those who do not. 
This again underlines that control groups of non-radicalised converts are needed to 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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assess what sets those who do become involved in Islamist extremism and militancy 
apart. Hopefully, future research will be able to delve into this particular aspect in more 
detail. 
 
In general, the studies referred to in this Policy Brief emphasise that understanding 
convert radicalisation requires a multifaceted analytical approach and a nuanced 
conceptualisation of the issue. Most converts never become involved in radicalism or 
militancy. The minority of converts that do radicalise do so for a wide variety of reasons. 
Rather than seeing radicalised converts as stereotypically damaged persons or as 
individuals seeking meaning who were preyed upon by recruiters, available insights 
paint a heterogeneous picture of the processes that can lead to involvement in Islamist 
militancy. To improve our understanding of this phenomenon, future research should 
not only be empirically robust but also analytically diverse enough to study the 
influence of a range of factors present at the individual, group and structural levels of 
analysis – as well as in the process of conversion itself. 
 
More specifically, the findings discussed in this Policy Brief allow four 
recommendations for future research to be formulated. These are: 
 
(I.) Collating more up-to-date and reliable information about the number of 
converts in Western countries and about the size of the Muslim populations 
in most countries; 
(II.) Gaining more accurate information (per country) regarding the involvement 
of Western converts in jihadi related offence and an (ongoing) monitoring of 
the number of converts among foreign fighters; 
(III.) Developing and empirically testing theories with regard to convert 
radicalisation as they relate to various levels of analysis; 
(IV.) Assessing how the factors and processes that can lead to converts’ 
involvement in Islamist militancy are different from those experienced by non-
convert militants in similar settings. 
 
There is an urgent need for more work on this topic. Hopefully, this Policy Brief can 
make some contribution toward accomplishing that goal. 
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